This paper documents evidence that rejects the paradox of dissatisfied union members. Using eleven waves of the BHPS, it studies the past, contemporaneous, and future effects of union membership on job satisfaction. By separating union "free-riders" from union-covered nonmembers in the fixed effects equations, I find significant anticipation effects to unionism for both prospective members and covered nonmembers of both genders. Workers go on to report, on average, a significant net increase in the overall job satisfaction at the year unionization occurs. Nonetheless, adaptation to unionism is complete within the first few years of unionization. One hypothesis for this is that workers adapt their reported satisfaction over time to support their union bargaining efforts, which would be consistent with the explanation given by Freeman and Medoff (1984) of union"s role in fanning the flame of discontent to the management during contract negotiations.
I. Introduction
Perhaps one of the most well-known results in trade union and collective-bargaining literature is that from studies which find that union members are generally less satisfied with their jobs compared to nonmembers (see, e.g., Freeman, 1978; Borjas, 1979; Clark, 1997; Heywood, Siebert, & Wei, 2002; Guest & Conway, 2004; Meng, 1990; Renaud, 2002; Garcia-Serrano, 2009; Miller, 2008) . This finding is deeply counterintuitive: Given that unionism often leads to more bargaining power and improved working conditions, one would expect it to lead to greater job satisfaction rather than less. Freeman (1978 Freeman ( , 1980 and Freeman and Medoff (1984) argue that the negative relationship between unionism and job satisfaction is a reflection of the role of unions as a "voice" for workers. According to them, unionized workers are encouraged by their union to express their discontent and grievances to the management, thereby raising the level of apparent job dissatisfaction among union members during contract negotiations. This is reflected in the finding that union members often express lower job satisfaction than nonmembers but express relatively high satisfaction with their unions (Fiorito, Gallagher, & Fukumi, 1988; Jarley, Kuruvilla, & Casteel, 1990) . Duncan (1976) and Borjas (1979) propose that unionized jobs are inherently unpleasant and so a union wage effect can be viewed as a compensating differential for lowered job satisfaction overall. Moreover, Borjas (1979) argues that the impact of unionism on job satisfaction will also depend on the strength of the trade union to maintain the "full wage" and non-pecuniary job rewards. An inverse relationship is therefore possible if there is a significant discrepancy between what is expected and what is actually received by union members. More recently, Bryson, Capellari, and Lucifora (2004) hypothesized that the negative relationship between unionism and job satisfaction may reflect the role of workers" unobserved heterogeneity, i.e., those who are intrinsically unhappy with their jobs are more likely to join the union and involve themselves in union activities than those who are not, thus leading to lower job satisfaction among union members relative to nonmembers.
The above arguments imply one important empirical implication, namely, if we are able to control sufficiently for individual and workplace heterogeneity, as well as allowing for the selection effect into a unionized job, then it may be possible to estimate a net effect of union membership on job satisfaction that is both causal and nonnegative. However, owing to data limitations (restricted controls and unrepresentative or small samples), only a handful of studies have been able to satisfy the above requirements. The notable examples are Bryson et al. (2004) , Bender and Sloane (1998) , Gordon and Denisi (1995), and Ranaud (2002) . Using linked employer-employee data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) for the U.K., Bryson et al. (2004) found that unionized workers report, on average, significantly lower levels of job satisfaction compared to nonunionized workers. However, they found that the well-being gap between the two groups becomes statistically insignificant once individual heterogeneity, establishment heterogeneity, and selection effects are controlled for in the estimation. Based on this finding, they argued that unions are successful at securing an attractive wage package for their members only insofar as that it is large enough to offset their intrinsic dissatisfaction generated by higher expectations about their job. Using the Social Change and Economic Life Initiative (SCELI) data set, Bender and Sloane (1998) controlled for the selection into being a union member by using employee perceptions of employer attitudes as instruments. Treating union membership as exogenous, they were able to show that the correlation between union membership and job satisfaction, albeit negative, is not statistically significantly different from zero. Finally, Gordon and Denisi (1995) and Ranaud (2002) reported statistically insignificant effects of union membership on either job satisfaction or the intent to quit once working conditions are controlled for.
The finding that trade unions do nothing to improve workers" job satisfaction is a bitter pill to swallow for workers who may be considering about the prospective benefits in the forms of improved wages and working conditions from joining the union. Yet it is the conclusion upon which many studies have come to agree. This paper, however, proposes that the discussion regarding the role of union membership on job satisfaction may be far from over.
In this paper, I argue that previous empirical studies have consistently failed to take the following information into account when making their analysis on the impact of unionism on job satisfaction: (a) levels of workers" job satisfaction in the periods before and after joining the union, and (b) the status of union coverage of the control group. As a result, previous studies, which have mainly been studies of cross-section data sets, have failed to consider that (1) the estimated effects of union membership and/or union coverage on job satisfaction at cross-sections may not only suffer from unobserved heterogeneityin that unhappy workers are more likely to select themselves into a unionized job -but may also be biased owing to confounding time-varying endogenous effects.
For example, there may be significant anticipation effects to joining the union and/or becoming union-covered, e.g., the same worker may have been experiencing a decline in job satisfaction for some years before she decides to become a union member. It is therefore possible that there could be a positive net impact on job satisfaction in the first year of joining the union, which would not have been picked up before in prior studies; (2) when estimating the effect of union membership on job satisfaction, there may be a significant free-rider problem among covered nonmembers (workers who are covered by collective bargaining agreements but are not union members) that, if unaccounted for, can bias the overall estimates of the union membership effects;
and (3) there may be significant mean-reversion or adaptation effects to the initial impact of union membership on job satisfaction, which could lead to an underestimation of the union effect.
Taking the above factors into account, it may therefore be possible to estimate a net union membership effect that is both positive and statistically significant. Since Richard Freeman"s (1984) caveats against the use of short-run longitudinal data sets to estimate the impact of union membership (simply because the associated measurement error bias stemming from the fact that workers hardly change their union status in short-run panels is too great), we now have at our disposal many rich, long-run micro-panel data sets, with a reasonably good number of observations of those who change their membership status over time. This paper uses eleven years (Waves 5-15) of the British Household Panel Surveys (BHPS) to study the leads and lags in job satisfaction to having a recognized union at the workplace for (i) all workers who went on to be employed at a unionized firm, with this sample split further into (ii) prospective union members, and (iii) prospective covered nonmembers.
Section II briefly discusses the psychological concepts of anticipation and adaptation, as well as the free-rider problem. Data and analytical strategy are outlined in Section III.
Section IV reports the results. Section V concludes.
II. Concepts

A. Anticipation effects
When we think of anticipation, we think of the effect of an event of interest on well-being before it actually occurs (Clark, Diener, Georgellis, & Lucas, 2008; Frijters, Johnston, & Shields, 2008) . In the context of unionism and job satisfaction, one hypothesis may be that non-union members go through a significant decline in their perceptions about work conditions over time, which leads them to join or form a trade union in the future. This can be captured empirically by looking at the coefficients on a series of lead variables (will form the union in the next 12 months, in the next 1-2 years, etc.) in job satisfaction equations. In the analysis of anticipation effects to unionism, an individual fixed effect must be introduced so that any negative effect of the lead variables will pick up anticipation rather than selection (where those who are inherently unhappy with their jobs are also those who are likely to join or form the union). Failure to take into account the anticipation effect may bias the union effect in the same direction as the usual selection bias.
B. Free-rider problem
Previous empirical studies on the impact of unionism on job satisfaction have often failed to distinguish between union members and union-covered workers who are non-members in job satisfaction equations; typically, a dummy variable representing union status will take a value of 1 if the individual is a union member and 0 otherwise, suggesting that non-members in union-covered firms and non-covered workers will fall within the same zero category. This would be acceptable if the decision to remain a nonmember at a unionized firm is exogenous, which may not always be the case (Chaison & Dhavale, 1992; Booth, 1985; Booth & Bryan, 2001 ). The results on the benefits of free-rider status (employees who are covered by collective-bargaining agreements but not members) are mixed. In terms of the estimated wage differentials, Kahn (1980) and Belfield and Heywood (2001) showed that union threat effects by covered nonmembers have a positive impact on the nonunion wages which exceeds that of the average pay package received by nonmembers in the uncovered sector. Using WERS 1998 data sets, Booth and Bryan (2001) found evidence of zero wage premia between union members and covered nonmembers once union membership is instrumented. By contrast, Budd and Na (2000) found for the US, and Hildreth (1999) for the UK, that covered nonmembers do not receive the same wage premia as covered members. Nonetheless, in a more novel approach to identify the differences between the two groups, Clark (2001) found using the BHPS that a dissatisfied union member and a dissatisfied covered nonmember have a statistically identical probability to quit. In other words, his results supports the notion that union dissatisfaction reflect workers" true well-being rather than an artifact of institutional structures that make union members more likely to express dissatisfaction. However, he also found that a worker with low job satisfaction at a "union-recognized" workplace is less likely to quit than an identical worker at a workplace where a union is not recognized. In addition to this, Jarley and Fiorito (1990) concluded that it is the union free-riders rather than noncovered workers who are significantly more likely to indicate a preference for pro-union voting intent, which is at odds with "right-to-work" advocates" view of free-riders as "principled conscientious objectors". Given these conflicting findings, further analysis that distinguishes between union members, covered nonmembers, and nonmembers in the uncovered sector is warranted 1 .
C. Adaptation
When we think of adaptation, we think of the processes that reduce the effects of repeated sensory and cognitive stimuli (see, e.g., Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999) . In other words, adaptation generally refers to the decline in satisfaction over time after the event has occurred. Empirical studies in this area have found significant evidence of adaptation to marriage and divorce (Lucas & Clark, 2006; Zimmerman & Easterlin, 2006) , income (Di Tella, Haisken-DeNew, & MacCulloch, 2005) , disability (Oswald & Powdthavee, 2008; Powdthavee, 2009) , and unemployment (Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, & Diener, 2004) . With regards to unionism, one could hypothesize that union members get "used to" improvements in the pay package and work conditions. After a period of satisfaction, the psychological effects of union membership adapt to a base level and cognitive changes in interests, values and goals set in. In this process, workers increase their expectation (or aspiration) level (Stutzer, 2004) .
III. Implementing a test
A. Empirical implications
Are there anticipation effects to forming a union or staff association to negotiate wages and work conditions with the management? Is there a free-rider problem in the covered sector?
Do union workers adapt to their new work conditions? A test of these questions has to have a number of special features:
(i) individuals in the sample must be followed for a reasonably long period, so that information on them is available before and after joining a union-covered firm;
(ii) there needs to be a control group who does not join a union-covered firm;
(iii) A distinction between union members and nonmembers at a unionized firm can be made within the data set;
(iv) the sample should be representative of the working age population;
(v) a set of other job-related variables, particularly on occupation, has to be available in the data set, so that confounding influences can be differenced out.
No study of this type has apparently been published in either economic or industrial relations literature.
B. Data
The main data set comes from Waves 5-15 of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).
The BHPS is a nationally representative longitudinal data of British households, contains over 10,000 adult individuals (it interviews every adult member in the sampled households), and has been conducted between September and Christmas each year since 1991 (Taylor et
In every wave since Wave 1, individuals were asked to rate how satisfied they are with four different aspects of their job: total pay, job security, satisfaction with work itself, and hours of work 3 . Each of these criteria was to be given a number from one to seven, with one representing "very dissatisfied" and 7 "very satisfied". Approximately 61% of men and 50% of women in unionized firms are members of a union or a staff association. The data are unbalanced, in that there will be some people who are not present in all eleven waves.
In this study, I plan to conduct all statistical analysis separately by gender. This is because there is evidence to suggest that union may affect men and women differently. For example, studies in the 1980s seemed to suggest that women are less likely than men to be unionized (see, e.g., Antos, Chandler, & Mellow, 1980) as well as less inclined toward unionization, at least in studies of union membership status (Fiorito, Gallagher, & Greer, 1986) . Such results may be interpreted to mean that women have poorer perceptions toward unionization than do men. However, more recent studies argued that the lower unionization rates of women than of men stem not from lower interest in unions, but from barriers to unionization faced by women (Leigh & Hills, 1987; Schur & Kruse, 1992) . With respect to union commitment, there are some studies which report that women are significantly more committed to unions than are men (Sherer & Morishima, 1989; Bemmels, 1995) , suggesting that women may benefit more than men from unionization and thus the reason why they are more likely than men to identify with the union"s values and goals. However, as argued by Meyer and Allen (1997) , this is not a consistent finding, and it may reflect gender differences in terms of work characteristics and experience 5 . Studies on male-female differences in union voting behavior also reported inconsistent findings. While some have found no gender differences in general support for collective bargaining (Feuille & Blandin, 1974; Bigoness, 1978) , there are studies which have shown gender to be a strong predictor of union voting intentions (Sutton, 1980) and preferences . Moreover, there is evidence of women taking up more important roles at shaping union organizing styles in some female-dominated sectors (Crain, 1991) , suggesting that there may be more contemporaneously psychological benefits to unionizing amongst women as compared to men. Because of these ambiguous relationships between gender and union outcomes, it is difficult to speculate what the dynamics of job satisfaction by gender will be before and after unionizing. Thus, it seems scientifically important to study whether unions also affect men"s and women"s job satisfaction and its dynamics differently as well.
Since the vast majority of individuals can be tracked for far shorter periods of time than the available eleven BHPS waves, I concentrate only up to four years before and three years after union coverage. Finally, it is worth mentioning that, unlike some job satisfaction surveys which are conducted by the respondent"s employer, the responses to the question on job satisfaction in the BHPS are anonymous and conducted by an independent surveyor (again, see, Taylor et al, 2002) . What this implies is that self-rated job satisfaction scores should not be influenced by concerns that the respondent"s employer will find out who "voiced" their dissatisfactions.
C. Analytical Strategy
The first equation will consider the lead and lag effects of union coverage rather than union membership on job satisfaction. Here, I follow the method outlined in Frijters et al. (2008) and estimate the following lead and lag equation:
where JS represents job satisfaction. Here, 4 U  represents a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the individual will be covered by a union in the following 3 to 4 years. The other leading U dummies are defined similarly. If there is a lead effect to being covered by a union, then we would expect to see the lead coefficients to be zero or negative, and to be more negative the closer the periods of union coverage becomes. By contrast, the adaptation effects to being covered by a union are captured by three dummies: Union coverage 1-2 years, Union coverage 2-3 years, and Union coverage 3 years or more. u , is included in the equation so that we are effectively following the same individual through different periods prior to being employed at a unionized firm. The descriptive statistics for some of the variables used in this paper"s analysis are reported in Table A1 .
To test for the welfare impacts of union membership and union coverage on workers with free-rider status, i.e. covered nonmembers, Equations (1) can be rewritten to distinguish between covered members and covered nonmembers:
where UM is a dummy variable representing covered members. By interacting between lead and lag dummies of both union coverage and union membership, I am able to control for the timing of becoming a member of either a staff association or a union as some workers may decide to become a member in their second or third year rather than in their first year of their firm becoming union-covered. To interpret the coefficients, 3  , for example, represents the well-being impact of having worked in a union-covered firm for at least three years, whilst the sum
represents the well-being impact of being a union member for at least three years. In the case where allUM variables equal to zero, 3  on its own can be interpreted as the well-being impact of remaining a nonmember in a covered firm for at least three years.
The number of observations of the various lags and leads are presented in Table A2 in the appendix.
This set-up allows us to carry out simple tests of whether the dynamics of job satisfaction differ significantly between covered members, covered nonmembers, and noncovered workers. One hypothesis is that the anticipation effect, if any, will be more prominent amongst those who went on to become a covered member in the lead equation, compared to covered nonmembers. Moreover, if there is evidence of union free-riding (in that there are no statistical significant differences in terms of job satisfaction between union members and covered nonmembers) then we would expect all of the values of  to take some positive numbers, whilst all of the sums of    are expected to be statistically insignificantly different from zero at conventional levels 6 .
IV. Longitudinal results
A. Union coverage
Are union-covered workers more dissatisfied with their jobs compared to non-covered workers? A first look at the raw data evidence suggests that they are. Figures 1A & 1B show for men and women the reported levels of overall job satisfaction for covered workers and non-covered workers. We can see from both figures that, in every wave of the BHPS, noncovered workers report higher scores of overall job satisfaction compared to covered workers. Moreover, for eight of the eleven waves for men and nine of the eleven years for women, the differential is easily significant at the 5% level. This is consistent with previous studies that found a negative association between unionism and job satisfaction (Freeman, 1978; Borjas, 1979; Clark, 1997) .
Are covered workers always less satisfied with their jobs compared to non-covered workers? To answer this question, Table 1 presents within-person evidence of the dynamics of overall job satisfaction four years before and three years after employment at a unionized firm or a firm with a recognized staff association.
As anticipated, there is indeed a significant lead effect in overall job satisfaction one year before being covered by either a union or a staff association; the lead coefficient at T−1 is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for both men and women (although the drop took place earlier for men, at T−2). Given that individual fixed effects are controlled for in the regressions, the observed drop in the level of job satisfaction one year before being covered is independent from the negative selection effect -i.e., people who are inherently unhappy with their jobs are more likely to become covered workers in the future than those who are not unhappy (see, e.g., Bender & Sloane, 1998; Bryson et al., 2004) . In other words, what this result implies is that, for this particular sample of male and female workers, instead of quitting their jobs following a significant drop in their job satisfaction, they are more likely to become covered by collective bargaining agreements in the following year. It may also be the case that organizers of a prospective union or a potential staff association firm encourage all workers to voice their dissatisfaction at period T−1, which would in turn act as a justification for the formation of either a union or staff association at T. This explanation is consistent with that proposed by Freeman and Medoff (1984) , although the difference in the present case is that, instead of an existing union fanning the flames of discontent for bargaining purposes, organizers of a prospective union may encourage workers to express their discontentment and grievances early, before either organization is formed.
What is the contemporaneous effect of union coverage on overall job satisfaction?
Conditioning for individual fixed effects and personal and workplace characteristics, we can see that the net effects of a move from non-covered to being covered, i.e., between T−1 and T, are positive, sizeable, and statistically significant at the 1% level for both genders. As can be seen from Table 1 effect is slightly larger for women than for men, although the difference between these two coefficients is not statistically significant at conventional levels, i.e. the t-statistic = 1.177.
The results on the positive net impacts of unionizing contrast with the popular finding of a negative relationship between unionism and job satisfaction. They are also inconsistent with the existing theory that workers are encouraged upon becoming union members by their union to voice their dissatisfactions about their job and working environment to the management (Freeman & Medoff, 1984) . Instead, the results seem to support one of the more intuitive ideas about the role of trade unions, namely, that trade unions are there to improve the well-being of those associated with them. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, despite the positive net union coverage effect being observed at T for both male and female workers, job satisfaction remains, on average, either the same as, in the case of men, or significantly below, in the case of women, that of workers who reported to be in the uncovered sector throughout the sampling period.
This improvement in well-being, however, does not seem to last very long; within the first two years of becoming covered workers, there is a complete mean-reversion or adaptation effect. Put simply, it takes only two years of being covered by either a union or staff association for workers to become just as dissatisfied about their jobs as they used to be one year before the unionization occurred. One psychological explanation for this is that workers increase their level of expectation (or aspiration) very soon after becoming covered by unions. Another plausible explanation, which is more strategic than psychological, is that this further drop in workers" job satisfaction does not reflect the workers" true well-being and that the heightening of the level of discontent is there only to support their union"s bargaining efforts (Fiorito et al., 1988) 7 . Workers, in other words, adapt their reported satisfaction over time to support their union in its bargaining endeavors 8 . Table 2 examines the dynamic effects of union coverage on satisfaction with total pay, satisfaction with job security, satisfaction with work itself, and satisfaction with hours worked. Looking across the columns of the table, we can see that the net union coverage effect is both positive and statistically significant at conventional levels in two out of four domain-specific job satisfaction equations for men, and in three out of four for women. The largest of these effects is observed in the satisfaction-with-pay regressions: A move from a union or staff association coverage within the next year to being covered by collectivebargaining agreements is associated with a 0.16-point increase in satisfaction with pay for men and a 0.22-point increase for women. Given that income is controlled for in the satisfaction equations, we can naturally interpret these net union coverage effects on workers"
satisfaction with pay as non-pecuniary. There is evidence, in other words, that workers become significantly happier about their expected payments in the future in the first year of being union-covered. For women, the decision to becoming covered workers is associated on average with a significant improvement in the level of satisfaction with work itself, which does not seem to hold true for men. It is worth noting that these positive net union coverage effects are often preceded by one or two years of significant drops in workers" satisfaction levels, either with their pay, job security, or even with work itself, beyond what is normally experienced by those who remained in nonunionized firms throughout the panel. Workers then go on to report a significant drop in the level of satisfaction with both job security and work itself in the second year of being covered by a union or a staff association. However, perhaps rather unexpectedly, there appears to be zero adaptation to the positive net union coverage effect on the satisfaction-with-pay equation for both male and female workers.
What this implies is that the effect of being covered by collective-bargaining agreements upon satisfaction with pay never ceases to be positive even after four or more years spent at a unionized firm, i.e., all else being equal, the individual would have remained significantly dissatisfied with his or her pay if unionization did not take place at T. Table 3 goes on to estimate Equation (2) in order to examine whether the results obtained in Table 1 vary significantly by union membership status. The two questions of interest are whether (i) the negative anticipation effect upon overall job satisfaction found in the previous section is primarily driven by prospective union members rather than prospective union freeriders (or covered nonmembers) and (ii) there are any clear psychological benefits to union free-riding, i.e. the post-union impact on job satisfaction is statistically indistinguishable between union members and nonmembers in unionized firms. For simplicity, only the coefficients for those who have either been a union member or remained a nonmember since the first year of working for a union-covered firm are reported. there is a noticeable drop in the level of overall job satisfaction among male members one year before unionization occurs at T, for male free-riders the lead effect to becoming covered by collective bargaining agreements is not statistically different from zero. A similar pattern between members and free-riders is also obtained in the female sample regressions. There appears to be some statistical evidence of a positive net union coverage effect among freeriders in the first year of unionization, which is statistically more robust for women than for men. Third, there is strong adaptation to the positive union coverage effect following unionization for both members and free-riders of both genders. Finally, while there is evidence of free-riding generating positive satisfaction, it does not seem to generate any significant differences in overall job satisfaction over union members in general.
B. Union members versus union "free-riders"
C. Union satisfaction with pay premium
The non-pecuniary benefits of union coverage on satisfaction with pay, which could be interpreted as the effects of union coverage on workers" perception regarding their financial security in the future, are quantitatively important as well as statistically significant. To get some ideas about the size of the coverage impacts on satisfaction with pay, the "Union Satisfaction with Pay Premium" (or USPP for short) 9 can be calculated using the coefficient on pay and the estimated net union coverage effect obtained from the satisfaction with pay regression equations. Given that our pay variable is in a log form, the USPP equation can be written as follows: respectively. Based on current average real earnings of £18k (or $29 10 ) per annum for male nonmembers and £11k (or $18k) per annum for female nonmembers, the USPP are approximately £61k ($98k) and £82k ($131k) for men and for women. In other words, an average non-covered male worker would require additional pay worth three times his current earnings to feel indifferent about his wages as an average covered male worker in the first year of being covered. An average non-covered female worker, on the other hand, would require additional pay worth up to seven times her current earnings to be just as satisfied about her wages as an average covered female worker in the first year of being covered.
Nonetheless, given that income is potentially endogenous in the satisfaction with pay equation, the interpretation of these results is only illustrative and should therefore be treated with care 11 .
V. Conclusions
This paper utilizes data from the British Household Panel Survey (Waves 5-15) to study the relationship between job satisfaction and past, contemporaneous, and future union status. The main conclusions of this paper"s findings can be set out as follows:
A) Anticipation (from T−4 to T−1).
There is evidence to suggest that, on average, workers select themselves into a unionized firm at T based on how unhappy they have become with their jobs in the periods before T. This finding is consistent with the view that a worker"s decision on whether or not to join a unionized firm is endogenously determined (see, e.g., Hildreth, 1999; Budd & Na, 2000) .
B)
Net union coverage effect (a difference between T-1 and T). In contrast to the popular findings of zero or even negative effects of union coverage on job satisfaction, this paper finds a positive and significant improvement in workers" job satisfaction in the first year of unionization, an improvement that is statistically robust in both male and female samples. Free-riding also generates positive satisfaction, which seems consistent with studies that find beneficial effects from free-riding on wages (Booth, 1985; Chaison & Dhavale, 1992; Booth & Bryan, 2004) . The impact of union coverage on satisfaction with pay is large, as indicated by the calculated USPP, and is larger for women than for men.
C)
Adaptation (from T+1 to T+3). Evidence on adaptation to working in the covered sector is mixed. In terms of overall job satisfaction, there is evidence of a complete adaptation to the initial increase in job satisfaction within one year of working at a unionized firm for both men and women. There is, however, little adaptation to the initial increase in satisfaction with pay following unionization. An alternative explanation to the evidence of a continuing decline in satisfaction in the years that follow unionization is that workers may be adapting their reported satisfaction over time to support their union"s bargaining efforts, an explanation that would be consistent with that given by Freeman and Medoff (1984) .
These results are important for several reasons. First, the evidence of significant anticipation effects to unionism implies that, in addition to the usual unobserved heterogeneity, there are also omitted time-varying variables which differ between prospective covered workers (both members and nonmembers) and other "permanent" non-covered workers. Both types of endogeneity will therefore have to be taken into account if one wishes to estimate the causal effects of unionism on job satisfaction. Second, because of the potential free-rider problem, it is important to make clear distinctions between union members, covered nonmembers, and non-covered workers when constructing a union membership variable. Third, because of adaptation to unionism, it seems pertinent for future studies to control also for the number of years that individuals have been members of a trade union. Fourth, there is little difference in the way results are interpreted across gender, suggesting that a separate dynamic fixed-effects analysis of job satisfaction -one for men, and one for women -may not be necessary.
The fifth consequence of these results is purely descriptive. The evidence of a positive and statistically significant coverage effect on all workers at T suggests that there may in fact be no paradox at all to unionism. In other words, the workers" decision to form a union or staff association to negotiate their pay and working environment on their behalf is rational in the sense that they do indeed gain more satisfaction from their jobs in the first year of unionization. However, as the evidence of this paper clearly suggests, we would also need to take into consideration the adaptation effects to both union membership and union coverage if we want to build a more realistic and accurate economic model of trade unions.
I began by noting the famous paradox of dissatisfied union members. The above results seem to point toward a reverse conclusion -that there is indeed a statistically significant psychological benefit to unionizing, at least in the first year of becoming covered by collective bargaining agreements. In order to explain more systematically why this might be the case, future research should return to measure underlying psychological explanationse.g., self-esteem and self-worth -and examine their dynamics in the periods before and after unionization. Note: * indicates that the differences in average levels of job satisfaction between workers with union coverage and those without are statistically significant at the 5%. 
B) Lags
Lags (Male workers) Total
